IBM
IBM
IBM (NYSE: IBM) is a hybrid cloud and AI company. Following the 2021 spin-off of Kyndryl and the 2022 separation of L3Harris, IBM is now focused on three core businesses:
- Software: Red Hat (OpenShift), IBM Logic, Security, Storage, Automation — $23.6B ARR at end-2025, growing 11% YoY.
- Consulting: Global Business Services — strategy, application management, cloud consulting — $5.3B Q4 2025 revenue, +3% YoY.
- Infrastructure: IBM Z mainframes, Power Systems, Storage, ESG — $3.6B Q4 2025, +17% YoY, driven by AI infrastructure demand.
- Financing: IBM Global Financing — $0.2B Q4 2025, +10% YoY.
IBM's hybrid cloud strategy centers on Red Hat OpenShift as the enterprise platform for AI workloads. The company targets $40B+ in annual recurring revenue by 2028, with Software driving ~70% of the mix.
| Business Segment | Revenue | % of Total | YoY Growth | Margin | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Software | $26,400M | 39% | +11.0% | 40.0% | Star: Red Hat, Automation |
| Consulting | $21,200M | 31% | +3.0% | 15.0% | Steady, AI-driven demand |
| Infrastructure | $14,400M | 21% | +17.0% | 33.0% | AI infrastructure tailwinds |
| Financing | $800M | 1% | +10.0% | 25.0% | Supports core businesses |
| Blended Growth Rate | — | 100% | +9.7% | — | Weighted avg across segments |
| Metric | Value | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| ROIC | 12.5% | ≥12% strong |
| FCF Margin | 17.9% | ≥10% strong |
| Debt / EBITDA | 1.3x | ≤2x conservative |
| Revenue Trend | Growing 3yr | 3-year directional trend |
| FCF Margin Trend | Expanding | Directional margin trajectory |
| Analyst Revisions | Upward revisions | Last 90 days consensus direction |
| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($M) | $57,350 | $60,530 | $61,860 | $62,753 | $67,535 |
| Rev YoY Growth | — | +5.5% | +2.2% | +1.4% | +7.6% |
| Gross Margin | 54.9% | 54.0% | 55.4% | 56.7% | 58.2% |
| EBITDA ($M) | $12,409 | $7,173 | $14,692 | $12,176 | $17,285 |
| EBITDA Margin | 21.6% | 11.9% | 23.8% | 19.4% | 25.6% |
| Operating Income ($M) | $5,992 | $2,371 | $10,296 | $7,509 | $12,264 |
| Operating Margin | 10.4% | 3.9% | 16.6% | 12.0% | 18.2% |
| Net Income ($M) | $5,743 | $1,639 | $7,502 | $6,023 | $10,593 |
| Net Margin | 10.0% | 2.7% | 12.1% | 9.6% | 15.7% |
| EPS (diluted) | $5.21 | $1.80 | $8.14 | $6.43 | $11.17 |
| Free Cash Flow ($M) | $10,734 | $9,089 | $12,686 | $12,397 | $12,102 |
| Annual DPS | $6.550 | $6.590 | $6.630 | $6.670 | $6.710 |
| Total Debt ($M) | $26,000 | $25,300 | $24,100 | $21,800 | $22,300 |
| Year | Diluted Shares (M) | YoY Change | Buyback Spend ($M) | Buyback Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | 905.0M | — | $16,000 | 7.2% |
| 2022 | 903.0M | -0.2% | $17,500 | 7.9% |
| 2023 | 911.0M | +0.9% | $19,000 | 8.5% |
| 2024 | 922.0M | +1.2% | $20,500 | 9.1% |
| 2025 | 932.0M | +1.1% | $21,000 | 9.2% |
Net share reduction of ~12M shares since 2021 (~1.3% annual reduction). Buybacks are consistent, funded by strong FCF and debt issuance.
| Input | Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Risk-Free Rate (Rf) | 4.25% | 10-yr US Treasury yield |
| Beta (β) | 1.050 | Market beta (Finnhub) |
| Equity Risk Premium (ERP) | 5.5% | Damodaran US ERP |
| Cost of Equity (Ke) | 9.93% | Ke = Rf + β × ERP |
| Pre-Tax Cost of Debt | 4.50% | Interest exp / gross debt |
| After-Tax Cost of Debt (Kd) | 3.56% | × (1 − 21%) |
| Weight Equity (We) | 91.1% | Mkt cap $0.0B |
| Weight Debt (Wd) | 8.9% | Gross debt $0.0B |
| WACC | 9.36% | DCF discount rate |
| Scenario | Stage 1 (Yrs 1–5) | Stage 2 (Yrs 6–10) | Terminal g | WACC | Intrinsic Value | vs Price |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 🔴 Bear | 4.0% | 3.0% | 2.0% | 9.86% | $166 | ▼32.1% |
| 📊 Base | 6.5% | 4.5% | 2.5% | 9.36% | $239 | ▼2.2% |
| 🚀 Bull | 8.5% | 5.5% | 3.0% | 8.86% | $317 | ▲29.4% |
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 ✦ | Stage 1 | $12.50B | $11.38B | $11.38B |
| Year 2 ✦ | Stage 1 | $12.90B | $10.69B | $22.07B |
| Year 3 ✦ | Stage 1 | $13.20B | $9.96B | $32.02B |
| Year 4 ✦ | Stage 1 | $13.50B | $9.27B | $41.29B |
| Year 5 ✦ | Stage 1 | $13.80B | $8.62B | $49.91B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $14.21B | $8.08B | $58.00B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $14.64B | $7.58B | $65.58B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $15.08B | $7.11B | $72.68B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $15.53B | $6.66B | $79.35B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $16.00B | $6.25B | $85.59B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$207.6B | PV(TV)=$81.1B (49% of EV) | EV=$166.7B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $166.7B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $166 |
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 ✦ | Stage 1 | $13.50B | $12.34B | $12.34B |
| Year 2 ✦ | Stage 1 | $14.30B | $11.96B | $24.30B |
| Year 3 ✦ | Stage 1 | $15.20B | $11.62B | $35.92B |
| Year 4 ✦ | Stage 1 | $16.10B | $11.26B | $47.18B |
| Year 5 ✦ | Stage 1 | $17.00B | $10.87B | $58.05B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $17.77B | $10.39B | $68.43B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $18.56B | $9.92B | $78.36B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $19.40B | $9.48B | $87.84B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $20.27B | $9.06B | $96.90B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $21.19B | $8.66B | $105.56B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$316.5B | PV(TV)=$129.4B (55% of EV) | EV=$234.9B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $234.9B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $239 |
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 ✦ | Stage 1 | $14.20B | $13.04B | $13.04B |
| Year 2 ✦ | Stage 1 | $15.20B | $12.83B | $25.87B |
| Year 3 ✦ | Stage 1 | $16.50B | $12.79B | $38.66B |
| Year 4 ✦ | Stage 1 | $17.80B | $12.67B | $51.34B |
| Year 5 ✦ | Stage 1 | $19.00B | $12.43B | $63.76B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $20.05B | $12.04B | $75.81B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $21.15B | $11.67B | $87.48B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $22.31B | $11.31B | $98.79B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $23.54B | $10.96B | $109.76B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $24.83B | $10.63B | $120.38B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$436.5B | PV(TV)=$186.8B (61% of EV) | EV=$307.1B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $307.1B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $317 |
| WACC \ gT | 1.5% | 2.0% | 2.5% | 3.0% | 3.5% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7.4% | $295 | $313 | $335 | $362 | $396 |
| 7.9% | $269 | $284 | $302 | $323 | $349 |
| 8.4% | $248 | $260 | $274 | $291 | $311 |
| 8.9% | $229 | $239 | $251 | $265 | $281 |
| 9.4% | $213 | $221 | $231 | $242 | $255 |
| 9.9% | $199 | $206 | $214 | $223 | $234 |
| 10.4% | $186 | $192 | $199 | $207 | $215 |
| 10.9% | $175 | $180 | $186 | $192 | $200 |
| 11.4% | $164 | $169 | $174 | $180 | $186 |
Green = >10% above current price. Red = >10% below. Gold = within ±10%.
Log-linear trend fitted to full price history. ±1.5σ bands. Green shaded zone = bottom 25% of historical range — historically attractive entry.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Annual DPS | $6.710 |
| Current Yield | 2.74% |
| Consecutive Growth Years | 11 |
| 1-yr DPS CAGR | +0.6% |
| 3-yr DPS CAGR | +0.6% |
| 5-yr DPS CAGR | +0.6% |
| 10-yr DPS CAGR | +0.6% |
| Payout Ratio (DPS/EPS) | 60.0% |
| FCF Payout Ratio | 55.0% |
| Sustainability Verdict | Safe |
| Year | Low / Actual | Avg | High | # Analysts | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | $8.14 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2024 | $6.43 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2025 | $11.17 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2026 | $11.91 | $12.51 | $13.40 | 23 | Estimate |
| 2027 | $12.61 | $13.54 | $14.86 | 23 | Estimate |
| 2028 | $13.30 | $14.50 | $15.60 | 15 | Estimate |
| Year | Low / Actual | Avg | High | # Analysts | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | $61.9B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2024 | $62.8B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2025 | $67.5B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2026 | $69.4B | $71.9B | $75.1B | 23 | Estimate |
| 2027 | $71.5B | $75.2B | $79.6B | 23 | Estimate |
| 2028 | $73.0B | $77.5B | $82.0B | 15 | Estimate |
| Analyst | Firm | Rating | PT | Upside |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| David Grossman | Stifel | Strong Buy | $340 | +38.9% |
| Daniel Ives | Wedbush | Buy | $340 | +38.9% |
| Keith Bachman | BMO Capital | Hold | $290 | +18.5% |
| Brian Essex | JP Morgan | Hold | $283 | +15.6% |
| Erik Woodring | Morgan Stanley | Hold | $247 | +0.9% |
| Quarter | EPS Act vs Est | EPS Beat/Miss | Rev Act vs Est | Rev Beat/Miss | Guidance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q4 2025 | $2.85 vs $2.82 | +$0.03 ✅ | $19.7B vs $19.4B | +$0.3B ✅ | positive |
| Q3 2025 | $2.76 vs $2.68 | +$0.08 ✅ | $18.9B vs $18.7B | +$0.2B ✅ | positive |
| Q2 2025 | $2.69 vs $2.65 | +$0.04 ✅ | $18.5B vs $18.4B | +$0.1B ✅ | positive |
| Q1 2025 | $2.55 vs $2.50 | +$0.05 ✅ | $17.4B vs $17.2B | +$0.2B ✅ | — |
Bull Case: IBM is a leading hybrid cloud and AI infrastructure provider. Its acquisition of Red Hat in 2019 positioned it perfectly for the enterprise AI boom. OpenShift is now the de facto platform for AI workloads, and IBM is capturing significant market share in AI infrastructure (Z systems, Power Systems, ESG storage). Revenue growth is accelerating (17% in Infrastructure, 11% in Software), and FCF margins are expanding. At $245, the stock trades at a discount to analyst PTs of $311, implying significant upside.
Bear Case: IBM faces secular challenges in Consulting (automation displacing billable hours) and mainframe (declining enterprise IT budgets). The company has missed growth targets in the past, and the AI narrative is already priced in. If macro headwinds persist or AI adoption slows, the stock could rerate lower. The current dividend yield is modest (2.7%) and growth is minimal (0.6% annually).
Key Assumptions (Base Case):
- Revenue CAGR 6% over next 5 years (driven by Software +30%, Infrastructure +15%)
- FCF margin expands to 19% by 2030 (operating leverage)
- WACC 9.36% (cost of capital)
- Terminal growth 2.5% (in line with nominal GDP)
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- recommend
- flexible
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| Tier | Price | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 — Starter | ≤$220 | Begin position |
| Tier 2 — Add | ≤$203 | Add on weakness |
| Tier 3 — Full | ≤$174 | Full allocation |
| Sell Alert | ≥$275 | Above fair value — consider trimming |
Verdict: Accumulate. At $244.80, the shares trade meaningfully below the base-case value of $239, implying roughly -2% upside to fair value. Starter zone is $220 or below, with more aggressive adds on deeper weakness.