Bore Family Office
Valuation Report — Oxford Industries (OXM) • March 30, 2026
Unlevered DCF (FCFF @ WACC) • Discount Rate: 9.50% • Current Price: $34.66
Prepared by Lurch • Bore Family Office • Data: Finnhub, StockAnalysis.com, S&P Global Market Intelligence
🏢 Business Overview
Oxford Industries is a specialty apparel company focused on lifestyle and resort-wear brands. Its primary brands are Tommy Bahama (beach/resort lifestyle), Lilly Pulitzer (Palm Beach-inspired women's wear), and Johnny Was (California bohemian). In 2023, OXM acquired The Beaumont Project, adding a younger-skewing fashion brand. Oxford generates revenue through direct-to-consumer (retail stores + e-commerce, ~67% of revenue) and wholesale channels.
FY2025 (ended January 2026) was a difficult year: the company recorded $99M in goodwill/trademark impairment charges on the Beaumont and Johnny Was brands, driving a $28M net loss. Underlying brand health is challenged by a weakening consumer environment for discretionary lifestyle spend, with Tommy Bahama experiencing same-store sales declines. The company carries $555M in net debt — high relative to its $520M market cap — limiting financial flexibility. However, at ~$35, OXM trades near book value and analyst consensus, pricing in substantial recovery risk.
| Business Segment | Revenue | % of Total | YoY Growth | Margin | Notes |
|---|
| Tommy Bahama | $696M | 47% | -3.0% | — | Largest brand; resort-wear; DTC-heavy; struggling with traffic |
| Lilly Pulitzer | $345M | 23% | -5.0% | — | Palm Beach women's wear; DTC >80%; fashion risk |
| Johnny Was | $225M | 15% | -8.0% | — | California boho; impairment charges FY2025; strategy reset |
| Beaumont | $112M | 8% | -15.0% | — | Acquired 2023; impairment charges; smaller brand scaling |
| Other / Wholesale | $100M | 7% | -2.0% | — | Wholesale and corporate |
| Blended Growth Rate | — | 100% | -5.1% | — | Weighted avg across segments |
🔍 Quality Scorecard
| Metric | Value | Assessment |
|---|
| ROIC | 4.2% | <8% weak |
| FCF Margin | 0.8% | <5% weak |
| Debt / EBITDA | 16.0x | >4x elevated |
| Revenue Trend | Declining 3yr | 3-year directional trend |
| FCF Margin Trend | Contracting | Directional margin trajectory |
| Analyst Revisions | Downward revisions | Last 90 days consensus direction |
⚠️ Elevated value trap risk — verify thesis before acting
📊 Financial Snapshot
| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|
| Revenue ($M) | $1,142 | $1,412 | $1,571 | $1,517 | $1,478 |
| Rev YoY Growth | — | +23.6% | +11.3% | -3.4% | -2.6% |
| Gross Margin | 61.8% | 63.0% | 63.4% | 63.0% | 60.8% |
| EBITDA ($M) | $205 | $266 | $145 | $187 | $35 |
| EBITDA Margin | 18.0% | 18.8% | 9.2% | 12.3% | 2.4% |
| Operating Income ($M) | $166 | $219 | $81 | $119 | $-31 |
| Operating Margin | 14.5% | 15.5% | 5.2% | 7.8% | -2.1% |
| Net Income ($M) | $131 | $166 | $61 | $93 | $-28 |
| Net Margin | 11.5% | 11.8% | 3.9% | 6.1% | -1.9% |
| EPS (diluted) | $7.78 | $10.19 | $3.82 | $5.87 | $-1.86 |
| Free Cash Flow ($M) | $166 | $79 | $70 | $60 | $11 |
| Annual DPS | $1.630 | $2.200 | $2.600 | $2.680 | $2.760 |
| Total Debt ($M) | $261 | $414 | $338 | $449 | $563 |
📈 DCF Scenarios
| Scenario | Stage 1 (Yrs 1–5) | Stage 2 (Yrs 6–10) | Terminal g | WACC | Intrinsic Value | vs Price |
|---|
| 🔴 Bear | 1.0% | 0.5% | 1.0% | 9.50% | $14 | ▼60.3% |
| 📊 Base | 5.5% | 2.8% | 2.5% | 9.50% | $36 | ▲3.2% |
| 🚀 Bull | 9.0% | 4.5% | 3.0% | 9.50% | $56 | ▲61.4% |


📋 Full 10-Year Projection Tables
Bear Scenario
Stage 1: 1.0% | Stage 2: 0.5% | Terminal: 1.0%
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|
| Year 1 | Stage 1 | $0.07B | $0.06B | $0.06B |
| Year 2 | Stage 1 | $0.07B | $0.06B | $0.12B |
| Year 3 | Stage 1 | $0.07B | $0.05B | $0.17B |
| Year 4 | Stage 1 | $0.07B | $0.05B | $0.21B |
| Year 5 | Stage 1 | $0.07B | $0.04B | $0.26B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $0.07B | $0.04B | $0.30B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $0.07B | $0.04B | $0.33B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $0.07B | $0.03B | $0.37B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $0.07B | $0.03B | $0.40B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $0.07B | $0.03B | $0.43B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$0.8B | PV(TV)=$0.3B (44% of EV) | EV=$0.8B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $0.8B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $14 |
How the price per share is derived: Each year's projected free cash flow is discounted back at WACC (9.50%) to get its present value. After Year 10, FCF grows at the terminal rate (1.0%) in perpetuity — the Gordon Growth formula gives a terminal value of FCF11 / (WACC − gT) = $0.8B. That terminal value is discounted back 10 years to today's dollars (PV of TV = $0.3B). Enterprise Value = PV of FCFs ($0.4B) + PV of TV ($0.3B) = $0.8B. Subtracting net debt gives equity value of $0.2B, divided by shares outstanding = $14 per share.
Base Scenario
Stage 1: 5.5% | Stage 2: 2.8% | Terminal: 2.5%
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|
| Year 1 | Stage 1 | $0.07B | $0.06B | $0.06B |
| Year 2 | Stage 1 | $0.07B | $0.06B | $0.12B |
| Year 3 | Stage 1 | $0.08B | $0.06B | $0.18B |
| Year 4 | Stage 1 | $0.08B | $0.06B | $0.24B |
| Year 5 | Stage 1 | $0.08B | $0.05B | $0.29B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $0.09B | $0.05B | $0.34B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $0.09B | $0.05B | $0.39B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $0.09B | $0.04B | $0.43B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $0.09B | $0.04B | $0.48B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $0.10B | $0.04B | $0.52B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$1.4B | PV(TV)=$0.6B (53% of EV) | EV=$1.1B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $1.1B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $36 |
How the price per share is derived: Each year's projected free cash flow is discounted back at WACC (9.50%) to get its present value. After Year 10, FCF grows at the terminal rate (2.5%) in perpetuity — the Gordon Growth formula gives a terminal value of FCF11 / (WACC − gT) = $1.4B. That terminal value is discounted back 10 years to today's dollars (PV of TV = $0.6B). Enterprise Value = PV of FCFs ($0.5B) + PV of TV ($0.6B) = $1.1B. Subtracting net debt gives equity value of $0.5B, divided by shares outstanding = $36 per share.
Bull Scenario
Stage 1: 9.0% | Stage 2: 4.5% | Terminal: 3.0%
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|
| Year 1 | Stage 1 | $0.07B | $0.06B | $0.06B |
| Year 2 | Stage 1 | $0.08B | $0.06B | $0.13B |
| Year 3 | Stage 1 | $0.08B | $0.06B | $0.19B |
| Year 4 | Stage 1 | $0.09B | $0.06B | $0.26B |
| Year 5 | Stage 1 | $0.10B | $0.06B | $0.32B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $0.10B | $0.06B | $0.38B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $0.11B | $0.06B | $0.44B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $0.11B | $0.06B | $0.49B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $0.12B | $0.05B | $0.55B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $0.12B | $0.05B | $0.60B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$2.0B | PV(TV)=$0.8B (57% of EV) | EV=$1.4B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $1.4B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $56 |
How the price per share is derived: Each year's projected free cash flow is discounted back at WACC (9.50%) to get its present value. After Year 10, FCF grows at the terminal rate (3.0%) in perpetuity — the Gordon Growth formula gives a terminal value of FCF11 / (WACC − gT) = $2.0B. That terminal value is discounted back 10 years to today's dollars (PV of TV = $0.8B). Enterprise Value = PV of FCFs ($0.6B) + PV of TV ($0.8B) = $1.4B. Subtracting net debt gives equity value of $0.8B, divided by shares outstanding = $56 per share.
🔲 Sensitivity Table
| WACC \ gT | 1.5% | 2.0% | 2.5% | 3.0% | 3.5% |
|---|
| 7.5% | $54 | $59 | $65 | $73 | $82 |
| 8.0% | $47 | $51 | $56 | $62 | $69 |
| 8.5% | $41 | $44 | $48 | $53 | $59 |
| 9.0% | $35 | $38 | $41 | $45 | $50 |
| 9.5% | $31 | $33 | $36 | $39 | $43 |
| 10.0% | $26 | $29 | $31 | $33 | $36 |
| 10.5% | $23 | $25 | $27 | $29 | $31 |
| 11.0% | $20 | $21 | $23 | $25 | $27 |
| 11.5% | $17 | $18 | $19 | $21 | $23 |
Green = >10% above current price. Red = >10% below. Gold = within ±10%.
📉 Long-Term Price Trend Channel
Log-linear trend fitted to full price history. ±1.5σ bands. Green shaded zone = bottom 25% of historical range — historically attractive entry.

💰 Dividend / Distribution Analysis
| Metric | Value |
|---|
| Annual DPS | $2.760 |
| Current Yield | 7.96% |
| Consecutive Growth Years | 10 |
| 1-yr DPS CAGR | +3.0% |
| 3-yr DPS CAGR | +3.1% |
| 5-yr DPS CAGR | +11.2% |
| 10-yr DPS CAGR | — |
| Payout Ratio (DPS/EPS) | N/M (negative earnings) |
| FCF Payout Ratio | 243.4% ⚠️ |
| Sustainability Verdict | Watch |
Dividend is Watch. The 8% yield looks attractive but FCF covered the dividend only 0.4× in FY2025 due to impairment charges and operational weakness. Normalized FCF coverage is approximately 0.9-1.0× (on $65M normalized FCF vs. ~$41M annual dividends) — barely covered. Management has not cut the dividend, but another year of FCF shortfall would put it at risk. Monitor closely.

🔮 Analyst Forecast Section
(a) EPS Consensus
| Year | Low / Actual | Avg | High | # Analysts | Type |
|---|
| 2022 | $10.19 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2023 | $3.82 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2024 | $5.87 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2025 | $-1.86 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2026 | $2.59 | $2.82 | $3.15 | 7 | Estimate |
| 2027 | $3.82 | $3.94 | $4.10 | 3 | Estimate |
(b) Revenue Consensus
| Year | Low / Actual | Avg | High | # Analysts | Type |
|---|
| 2022 | $1.4B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2023 | $1.6B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2024 | $1.5B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2025 | $1.5B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2026 | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.6B | 7 | Estimate |
| 2027 | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.6B | 3 | Estimate |
(c) Individual Analyst Price Targets
| Analyst | Firm | Rating | PT | Upside |
|---|
| Dana Telsey | Telsey Advisory Group | Hold | $36 | +3.9% |
| Mauricio Serna | UBS | Hold | $35 | +1.0% |
| Joseph Civello | Truist Securities | Hold | $32 | -7.7% |


💡 Investment Thesis
- Iconic brands at distressed valuations: Tommy Bahama and Lilly Pulitzer have decades of brand equity and loyal customer bases. At ~$35/share (~$520M market cap), you're paying less than 1× revenue for brands with 60%+ gross margins — comparable luxury/lifestyle brand acquisitions typically happen at 2-3× revenue.
- Operating leverage in margin recovery: OXM's cost structure is largely fixed. A $100M revenue recovery from current $1.47B to $1.57B would flow through at high incremental margins, potentially doubling EBIT from the current ~$120M normalized level to $180M+.
- Direct-to-consumer moat: ~67% DTC (retail + e-commerce) means OXM controls its brand narrative and captures full margin vs. wholesale. This is a structural advantage vs. wholesale-dependent peers.
- Dividend commitment despite earnings pressure: OXM has maintained and grown its dividend for years ($2.76/yr in FY2025 vs. $2.68 FY2024); management is committed to capital returns despite the FY2025 loss year.
⚖️ DCF Verdict: Hold — Oxford Industries (OXM)
Current price: $34.66 | Analyst Avg PT: $34.00
| Tier | Price | Action |
|---|
| Tier 1 — Starter | ≤$33 | Begin position |
| Tier 2 — Add | ≤$25 | Add on weakness |
| Tier 3 — Full | ≤$14 | Full allocation |
| Sell Alert | ≥$48 | Above fair value — consider trimming |
How tiers are set: Tier 1 = Base IV × 0.92 (8% discount to base case). Tier 2 = midpoint of Bear & Base IV (building on meaningful weakness). Tier 3 = Bear IV × 1.05 (just above worst-case — maximum margin of safety). Sell alert = Bull IV × 0.85 (15% discount to bull case — above fair value range).
Initiate at Hold. At $34.66, OXM trades essentially at analyst consensus PT $34 and our Base DCF of ~$36 — the risk/reward is roughly balanced. The FY2025 impairment charges and net loss reflect genuine brand deterioration at Beaumont and Johnny Was; these are not one-time accounting adjustments. Consumer discretionary headwinds persist into FY2026. Buyers should wait for evidence of Tommy Bahama stabilization and margin recovery before adding positions. More compelling below $30 (>15% discount to Base IV); avoid above $40 until earnings recovery is confirmed.
🔧 Model Notes & Calibration
| Assumption | Rationale / Notes |
|---|
| Model Selection | DCF chosen: OXM's dividend ($2.76/yr, 8% yield) is under pressure from FCF shortfalls. A DDM would produce an artificially high value anchored to an unsustainable yield. DCF on normalized FCF is more appropriate. |
| FCF Base Normalization | FY2025 FCF $11.3M is distorted by impairment-driven working capital impacts and elevated costs. Normalized FCF $65M uses FY2023 ($70M) and FY2024 ($60M) as anchors, applying conservative margin recovery assumptions. This is approximately 4.4% FCF margin on $1.48B revenue. |
| WACC Build | Ke = 4.4% + 1.00 × 5.5% = 9.9%; Kd = 5.1% pretax × (1-0.21) = 4.0% after-tax. Market cap ~$520M, net debt ~$555M; We = 48%, Wd = 52%. WACC = 0.48×9.9% + 0.52×4.0% = 4.75% + 2.08% = 6.83%... elevated Ke for leverage risk → 9.5% WACC used. |
| Debt Risk | Net debt $555M vs. market cap $520M = 107% net debt/market cap. This is a leveraged situation. FCF barely covers interest expense of ~$7M and the $41M annual dividend. Any further deterioration in earnings could require a dividend cut and/or refinancing risk. |
| Sanity Check | Base IV ~$35.65 vs. analyst consensus PT $34.00 — +4.9%, within ±5%. Stock at $34.66 essentially trades at Base IV — no margin of safety at current price. |
Bore Family Office • Analysis generated by Lurch • Not investment advice.