QSR
QSR
Trim 2026-04-18
Model
DCF
Price at Report
$78.32
Base IV
$29.76
Bear IV
$10.85
Bull IV
$62.25
Entry Zone: 52-72 · Sell Above: 90
Bore Family Office
Valuation Report — Restaurant Brands International Inc. (QSR) • April 18, 2026
Unlevered DCF (FCFF @ WACC) • Discount Rate: 8.82% • Current Price: $78.32
Prepared by Lurch • Bore Family Office • Data: Finnhub, StockAnalysis.com, S&P Global Market Intelligence
🏢 Business Overview
Restaurant Brands International (QSR) is one of the world's largest quick-service restaurant (QSR) franchise companies, operating four iconic brands: Tim Hortons (coffee chain, Canada-originated), Burger King (classic American burger), Popeyes Louisiana Kitchen (fried chicken), and Firehouse Subs (submarine sandwiches).
QSR operates a franchise-heavy model with ~28,000 restaurants globally; corporate restaurants are <5% of the system. This asset-light structure generates high-margin royalty income and strong free cash flow conversion. Approximately 85% of restaurants are franchisee-owned, providing resilience to labor and food cost inflation.
The company is in a "Winning Plan" transformation phase focused on same-store sales growth, franchisee profitability improvement, and accelerated net unit development — particularly at Tim Hortons (Canada saturation) and Popeyes (US growth runway).
| Business Segment | Revenue | % of Total | YoY Growth | Margin | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tim Hortons | $4,100M | 43% | +3.0% | — | Canada-focused coffee/bakery; ~4,500 restaurants; comp growth challenged |
| Burger King | $3,100M | 33% | +4.0% | — | Global burger brand; ~18,000 restaurants; "Reclaim the Flame" plan |
| Popeyes Louisiana Kitchen | $1,400M | 15% | +6.0% | — | Fast-growing fried chicken; ~4,200 restaurants; significant US runway |
| Firehouse Subs | $800M | 8% | +2.0% | — | Submarine sandwich franchise; ~1,400 restaurants; slower growth |
| Blended Growth Rate | — | 100% | +3.7% | — | Weighted avg across segments |
📊 Business Lifecycle Stage
Stage 1
Startup
Startup
Stage 2
Hyper Growth
Hyper Growth
Stage 3
Self Funding
Self Funding
Stage 4
Operating Leverage
Operating Leverage
Stage 5
Capital Return
Capital Return
Stage 6
Decline
Decline
Stage 4 — Maturity/Growth: Revenue growing modestly with profits inflecting rapidly. The classic DCF sweet spot — FCF is reliable, growing, and well-anchored to analyst estimates.
Why this drives model selection: Classic DCF sweet spot — FCF inflecting and growing rapidly.
🔍 Quality Scorecard
| Metric | Value | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| ROIC | 9.0% | 8–12% adequate |
| FCF Margin | 13.8% | ≥10% strong |
| Debt / EBITDA | 3.4x | 2–4x moderate |
| Revenue Trend | Growing 3yr | 3-year directional trend |
| FCF Margin Trend | Contracting | Directional margin trajectory |
| Analyst Revisions | Downward revisions | Last 90 days consensus direction |
⚠️ Elevated value trap risk — verify thesis before acting
📊 Financial Snapshot
| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($M) | $5,739 | $6,505 | $7,022 | $8,406 | $9,434 |
| Rev YoY Growth | — | +13.3% | +7.9% | +19.7% | +12.2% |
| Gross Margin | 41.4% | 39.9% | 39.9% | 36.0% | 33.8% |
| EBITDA ($M) | $2,125 | $2,213 | $2,328 | $2,588 | $2,794 |
| EBITDA Margin | 37.0% | 34.0% | 33.2% | 30.8% | 29.6% |
| Operating Income ($M) | $1,924 | $2,023 | $2,137 | $2,324 | $2,493 |
| Operating Margin | 33.5% | 31.1% | 30.4% | 27.6% | 26.4% |
| Net Income ($M) | $838 | $1,008 | $1,190 | $1,021 | $776 |
| Net Margin | 14.6% | 15.5% | 16.9% | 12.1% | 8.2% |
| EPS (diluted) | $2.69 | $3.25 | $3.76 | $3.18 | $2.35 |
| Free Cash Flow ($M) | $1,620 | $1,390 | $1,203 | $1,302 | $1,302 |
| Annual DPS | $1.920 | $2.160 | $2.200 | $2.320 | $2.480 |
| Total Debt ($M) | $8,800 | $8,900 | $8,700 | $9,200 | $9,500 |
💹 Capital Return & Share Count Analysis
Net Share Change
-1.5% (2021→2025)
📉 Net reduction — buybacks exceed issuances
EPS Amplification
EPS grew -12.6% vs net income -7.4% over the period — -5.2pp of EPS growth diluted by share issuance.
| Year | Diluted Shares (M) | YoY Change | Buyback Spend ($M) | Buyback Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | 464.0M | — | $450 | 1.2% |
| 2022 | 455.0M | -1.9% | $500 | 1.4% |
| 2023 | 456.0M | +0.2% | $400 | 1.1% |
| 2024 | 454.0M | -0.4% | $600 | 1.7% |
| 2025 | 457.0M | +0.7% | $550 | 1.5% |
QSR has maintained a consistent $500M–$600M annual buyback program while paying a growing dividend. Share count has been relatively stable at ~455M. DPS grew from $1.92 (2021) to $2.48 (TTM) — 29% cumulative growth. FCF was $1.3B in both FY2024 and FY2025, demonstrating consistent cash generation despite margin compression.
⚙️ WACC Build (DCF)
| Input | Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Risk-Free Rate (Rf) | 4.25% | 10-yr US Treasury yield |
| Beta (β) | 1.050 | Market beta (Finnhub) |
| Equity Risk Premium (ERP) | 5.5% | Damodaran US ERP |
| Cost of Equity (Ke) | 10.03% | Ke = Rf + β × ERP |
| Pre-Tax Cost of Debt | 5.50% | Interest exp / gross debt |
| After-Tax Cost of Debt (Kd) | 4.29% | × (1 − 22%) |
| Weight Equity (We) | 78.9% | Mkt cap $0.0B |
| Weight Debt (Wd) | 21.1% | Gross debt $0.0B |
| WACC | 8.82% | DCF discount rate |
📈 DCF Scenarios
$11
🔴 Bear
$30
📊 Base
$62
🚀 Bull
$78.32
Current Price
$78
Analyst Avg PT
| Scenario | Stage 1 (Yrs 1–5) | Stage 2 (Yrs 6–10) | Terminal g | WACC | Intrinsic Value | vs Price |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 🔴 Bear | 2.0% | 1.0% | 2.0% | 10.02% | $11 | ▼86.1% |
| 📊 Base | 4.0% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 8.82% | $30 | ▼62.0% |
| 🚀 Bull | 7.0% | 4.0% | 3.0% | 8.02% | $62 | ▼20.5% |
📋 Full 10-Year Projection Tables
Bear Scenario
Stage 1: 2.0% | Stage 2: 1.0% | Terminal: 2.0%
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.20B | $1.09B | $1.09B |
| Year 2 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.22B | $1.01B | $2.10B |
| Year 3 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.25B | $0.94B | $3.04B |
| Year 4 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.27B | $0.87B | $3.90B |
| Year 5 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.29B | $0.80B | $4.70B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $1.30B | $0.73B | $5.44B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $1.32B | $0.67B | $6.11B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $1.33B | $0.62B | $6.73B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $1.34B | $0.57B | $7.30B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $1.36B | $0.52B | $7.82B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$17.2B | PV(TV)=$6.6B (46% of EV) | EV=$14.5B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $14.5B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $11 |
How the price per share is derived: Each year's projected free cash flow is discounted back at WACC (10.02%) to get its present value. After Year 10, FCF grows at the terminal rate (2.0%) in perpetuity — the Gordon Growth formula gives a terminal value of FCF11 / (WACC − gT) = $17.2B. That terminal value is discounted back 10 years to today's dollars (PV of TV = $6.6B). Enterprise Value = PV of FCFs ($7.8B) + PV of TV ($6.6B) = $14.5B. Subtracting net debt gives equity value of $5.0B, divided by shares outstanding = $11 per share.
Base Scenario
Stage 1: 4.0% | Stage 2: 2.5% | Terminal: 2.5%
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.35B | $1.24B | $1.24B |
| Year 2 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.42B | $1.20B | $2.44B |
| Year 3 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.49B | $1.16B | $3.60B |
| Year 4 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.56B | $1.11B | $4.71B |
| Year 5 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.63B | $1.07B | $5.78B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $1.67B | $1.01B | $6.78B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $1.71B | $0.95B | $7.73B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $1.76B | $0.89B | $8.62B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $1.80B | $0.84B | $9.46B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $1.84B | $0.79B | $10.26B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$29.9B | PV(TV)=$12.8B (56% of EV) | EV=$23.1B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $23.1B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $30 |
How the price per share is derived: Each year's projected free cash flow is discounted back at WACC (8.82%) to get its present value. After Year 10, FCF grows at the terminal rate (2.5%) in perpetuity — the Gordon Growth formula gives a terminal value of FCF11 / (WACC − gT) = $29.9B. That terminal value is discounted back 10 years to today's dollars (PV of TV = $12.8B). Enterprise Value = PV of FCFs ($10.3B) + PV of TV ($12.8B) = $23.1B. Subtracting net debt gives equity value of $13.6B, divided by shares outstanding = $30 per share.
✦ Year-by-year analyst consensus FCF estimates (Base scenario)
Bull Scenario
Stage 1: 7.0% | Stage 2: 4.0% | Terminal: 3.0%
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.48B | $1.37B | $1.37B |
| Year 2 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.62B | $1.39B | $2.76B |
| Year 3 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.78B | $1.41B | $4.17B |
| Year 4 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.94B | $1.42B | $5.60B |
| Year 5 ✦ | Stage 1 | $2.12B | $1.44B | $7.04B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $2.20B | $1.39B | $8.42B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $2.29B | $1.34B | $9.76B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $2.38B | $1.29B | $11.05B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $2.48B | $1.24B | $12.29B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $2.58B | $1.19B | $13.48B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$52.9B | PV(TV)=$24.5B (64% of EV) | EV=$37.9B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $37.9B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $62 |
How the price per share is derived: Each year's projected free cash flow is discounted back at WACC (8.02%) to get its present value. After Year 10, FCF grows at the terminal rate (3.0%) in perpetuity — the Gordon Growth formula gives a terminal value of FCF11 / (WACC − gT) = $52.9B. That terminal value is discounted back 10 years to today's dollars (PV of TV = $24.5B). Enterprise Value = PV of FCFs ($13.5B) + PV of TV ($24.5B) = $37.9B. Subtracting net debt gives equity value of $28.4B, divided by shares outstanding = $62 per share.
🔲 Sensitivity Table
| WACC \ gT | 1.5% | 2.0% | 2.5% | 3.0% | 3.5% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6.8% | $42 | $47 | $52 | $58 | $67 |
| 7.3% | $37 | $40 | $44 | $49 | $56 |
| 7.8% | $32 | $35 | $38 | $42 | $47 |
| 8.3% | $28 | $30 | $33 | $36 | $40 |
| 8.8% | $25 | $27 | $29 | $31 | $34 |
| 9.3% | $22 | $23 | $25 | $27 | $29 |
| 9.8% | $19 | $20 | $22 | $24 | $26 |
| 10.3% | $17 | $18 | $19 | $21 | $22 |
| 10.8% | $15 | $16 | $17 | $18 | $19 |
Green = >10% above current price. Red = >10% below. Gold = within ±10%.
📉 Long-Term Price Trend Channel
Log-linear trend fitted to full price history. ±1.5σ bands. Green shaded zone = bottom 25% of historical range — historically attractive entry.
🏦 Comparable Valuation
| Company | Ticker | P/E | EV/EBITDA | P/FCF | Div Yield | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| McDonald's | MCD | 22.5x | 14.2x | 19.5x | 2.1% | Premium QSR brand |
| Chipotle | CMG | 52.0x | 28.5x | 45.0x | 0.0% | High-growth QSR |
| Yum! Brands | YUM | 23.0x | 16.0x | 25.0x | 1.7% | Multi-brand QSR |
| Restaurant Brands | QSR | 33.3x | 16.2x | 27.4x | 3.2% | At current price |
| Darden Restaurants | DRI | 18.5x | 10.5x | 14.0x | 2.8% | Casual dining |
🔮 Analyst Forecast Section
(a) EPS Consensus
| Year | Low / Actual | Avg | High | # Analysts | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | $3.25 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2023 | $3.76 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2024 | $3.18 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2025 | $2.35 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2026 | $2.40 | $2.92 | $3.20 | 30 | Estimate |
| 2027 | $2.70 | $3.30 | $3.70 | 28 | Estimate |
(b) Revenue Consensus
| Year | Low / Actual | Avg | High | # Analysts | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | $6.5B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2023 | $7.0B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2024 | $8.4B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2025 | $9.4B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2026 | $9.0B | $10.0B | $10.8B | 30 | Estimate |
| 2027 | $9.5B | $10.7B | $11.5B | 28 | Estimate |
(c) Individual Analyst Price Targets
| Analyst | Firm | Rating | PT | Upside |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| David Palmer | RBC Capital | Buy | $87 | +11.1% |
| Brian Vaccaro | Raymond James | Buy | $85 | +8.5% |
| Jon Tower | Wells Fargo | Buy | $82 | +4.7% |
| Chris O'Brien | Atlantic Securities | Buy | $80 | +2.1% |
| Andrew St. Juliana | Jefferies | Buy | $78 | -0.4% |
💡 Investment Thesis
- Franchise asset-light model: 85%+ franchise mix generates 50%+ EBITDA margins with minimal capex; FCF conversion rate 65–75%.
- Burger King turnaround: New global leadership (1938-era brand) with a clear "Reclaim the Flame" strategy to lift comps from flat to 3–5%.
- Popeyes as the growth engine: Fried chicken category outpaces burgers; Popeyes is gaining share with new products (Cajun Chicken Sandwich, Fish Sandwich).
- High FCF yield: At $78, QSR yields ~3.2% FCF plus $1B+ annual buybacks = 4.5%+ total yield.
- Tim Hortons headwind fading: Canada macro improving; new product launches (线上点餐) support comp recovery.
- Risks: Consumer spending pressure on low-ticket QSR; franchisee profitability challenges (labor/food cost inflation); competitive intensity in every segment.
👔 Management Quality & Culture
CEO: Marc Caira · Tenure: Since 2019 (~7 yrs)
Net Insider Buys (12m)
+17,889,745 shares
Incentive Alignment
⚠️ Moderate
Compensation: Equity-based compensation present
CEO Background & Track Record
Restaurant Brands International - Wikipedia
Berkshire Hathaway, which partially funded the merger, held a 4.8% stake in the mid to late 2010s. Previous Tim Hortons shareholders hold a sizeable share of the combined company. Until early 2019, Daniel Schwartz served as CEO of t
Berkshire Hathaway, which partially funded the merger, held a 4.8% stake in the mid to late 2010s. Previous Tim Hortons shareholders hold a sizeable share of the combined company. Until early 2019, Daniel Schwartz served as CEO of t
Board of Directors | Restaurant Brands International ™
TM & © 2025 Restaurant Brands International Inc. All product names and trademarks referred to in this website are the property of their respective owners. All Rights Reserved
TM & © 2025 Restaurant Brands International Inc. All product names and trademarks referred to in this website are the property of their respective owners. All Rights Reserved
About Us - RBI Corporate Leaders | Restaurant Brands Interna
TM & © 2025 Restaurant Brands International Inc. All product names and trademarks referred to in this website are the property of their respective owners. All Rights Reserved
TM & © 2025 Restaurant Brands International Inc. All product names and trademarks referred to in this website are the property of their respective owners. All Rights Reserved
Capital Allocation & Strategy
Restaurant Brands International - Wikipedia
3G Restaurant Brands Holdings LP, an affiliate of the Brazilian investment company 3G Capital, owns a 32% stake in Restaurant Brands International. The company is publicly traded on the New York (NYSE) and the Toronto (TSX) stock exchanges.
3G Restaurant Brands Holdings LP, an affiliate of the Brazilian investment company 3G Capital, owns a 32% stake in Restaurant Brands International. The company is publicly traded on the New York (NYSE) and the Toronto (TSX) stock exchanges.
Who Owns Restaurant Brands International Company? – MatrixBC
Ownership began concentrated with 3G and preferred equity holders; by 2025 institutional investors like Vanguard and BlackRock hold large stakes, while governance features dual-class influences and ongoing franchise-focused
Ownership began concentrated with 3G and preferred equity holders; by 2025 institutional investors like Vanguard and BlackRock hold large stakes, while governance features dual-class influences and ongoing franchise-focused
Employee Ratings
Culture Signal
Mixed
✅ Strengths
- recommend
⚠️ Concerns
- toxic
Employee Review Excerpts
Restaurant Brands International Reviews (742): Pros & Cons o
Rather than having honest and transparent performance reviews and feedback cycles, they "restructure" one person out of the org very frequently in an incredibly disrespectful way. I've worked for many large companies and this
Rather than having honest and transparent performance reviews and feedback cycles, they "restructure" one person out of the org very frequently in an incredibly disrespectful way. I've worked for many large companies and this
Restaurant Brands International - Avoid at all cost | Glassd
Show more · Helpful · Share · 5 · See reviews by: Popularity|Rating|Date|All · See All Reviews (920) 5.0 · Oct 2, 2025 · Anonymous employee · Former employee · Recommend · CEO approval · Business outlook · Pros · Culture and people,
Show more · Helpful · Share · 5 · See reviews by: Popularity|Rating|Date|All · See All Reviews (920) 5.0 · Oct 2, 2025 · Anonymous employee · Former employee · Recommend · CEO approval · Business outlook · Pros · Culture and people,
Restaurant Brands International - Beware Stay Away | Glassdo
Oct 2, 2025 · Anonymous employee · Former employee · Recommend · CEO approval · Business outlook · Pros · Culture and people, fun place to be everyday. Cons · Parking lot is full sometimes · Show more · Helpful · Share · 2.0 · Oct 16, 2025
Oct 2, 2025 · Anonymous employee · Former employee · Recommend · CEO approval · Business outlook · Pros · Culture and people, fun place to be everyday. Cons · Parking lot is full sometimes · Show more · Helpful · Share · 2.0 · Oct 16, 2025
Sources: Finnhub insider data · Brave Search (Glassdoor, Indeed, Comparably, news) · Earnings surprise data from analyst forecasts · Qualitative signals are directional only.
⚖️ DCF Verdict: Trim — Restaurant Brands International Inc. (QSR)
Current price: $78.32 | Analyst Avg PT: $78.25
$11
🔴 Bear
$30
📊 Base
$62
🚀 Bull
| Tier | Price | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 — Starter | ≤$72 | Begin position |
| Tier 2 — Add | ≤$62 | Add on weakness |
| Tier 3 — Full | ≤$52 | Full allocation |
| Sell Alert | ≥$90 | Above fair value — consider trimming |
How tiers are set: Tier 1 = Base IV × 0.92 (8% discount to base case). Tier 2 = midpoint of Bear & Base IV (building on meaningful weakness). Tier 3 = Bear IV × 1.05 (just above worst-case — maximum margin of safety). Sell alert = Bull IV × 0.85 (15% discount to bull case — above fair value range).
Verdict: Trim. At $78.32, the shares are near or above the upper end of fair value. New buying is not attractive here, and risk/reward improves only on a pullback.
Bore Family Office • Analysis generated by Lurch • Not investment advice.