WHR
WHR
Whirlpool Corporation is the world's leading manufacturer of major home appliances, selling in ~170 countries under brands including Whirlpool, Maytag, KitchenAid, JennAir, Indesit, and Hotpoint. The company operates across North America (55% revenue), Europe (25%), and emerging markets (20%). WHR faces a structural demand challenge: housing turnover drives appliance purchases, and both new housing starts and existing home sales remain well below prior-cycle peaks. Cost restructuring (~$500M annual savings target) has restored profitability at the cost of significant workforce reductions and plant closures. The key question for investors is whether the housing recovery is real or whether WHR faces secular headwinds from reduced new construction and appliance efficiency improvements.
| Business Segment | Revenue | % of Total | YoY Growth | Margin | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| North America | $8,500M | 55% | -4.0% | — | Whirlpool, Maytag, KitchenAid; housing-sensitive |
| Europe / Middle East / Africa | $3,900M | 25% | -8.0% | — | Indesit, Hotpoint, Whirlpool EMEA; challenging |
| Latin America | $1,900M | 12% | +2.0% | — | Brastemp, Consul; market leader, currency risk |
| Asia / Other | $1,300M | 8% | +5.0% | — | India JV, Indonesia, Philippines growth |
| Blended Growth Rate | — | 100% | -3.6% | — | Weighted avg across segments |
Startup
Hyper Growth
Self Funding
Operating Leverage
Capital Return
Decline
Stage 5 — Value / Turnaround: Mature business returning capital via dividends and buybacks. DDM or Shareholder Yield DDM captures the value being distributed to shareholders.
Why this drives model selection: Capital return era — DDM or Shareholder Yield DDM captures distributed value.
| Metric | Value | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| ROIC | 4.5% | <8% weak |
| FCF Margin | 5.2% | 5–10% adequate |
| Debt / EBITDA | 3.5x | 2–4x moderate |
| Revenue Trend | Declining 3yr | 3-year directional trend |
| FCF Margin Trend | Stable (±1pp) | Directional margin trajectory |
| Analyst Revisions | Neutral | Last 90 days consensus direction |
| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($M) | $21,985 | $19,455 | $19,455 | $16,607 | $15,524 |
| Rev YoY Growth | — | -11.5% | +0.0% | -14.6% | -6.5% |
| Gross Margin | 20.1% | 15.8% | 16.3% | 15.5% | 15.4% |
| EBITDA ($M) | $2,842 | $1,376 | $476 | $476 | $1,176 |
| EBITDA Margin | 12.9% | 7.1% | 2.4% | 2.9% | 7.6% |
| Operating Income ($M) | $2,348 | $1,015 | $143 | $143 | $838 |
| Operating Margin | 10.7% | 5.2% | 0.7% | 0.9% | 5.4% |
| Net Income ($M) | $1,783 | $-1,519 | $-323 | $-323 | $318 |
| Net Margin | 8.1% | -7.8% | -1.7% | -1.9% | 2.0% |
| EPS (diluted) | $28.36 | $-27.18 | $-5.87 | $-5.87 | $5.66 |
| Free Cash Flow ($M) | $1,651 | $668 | $843 | $843 | $813 |
| Annual DPS | $5.450 | $7.000 | $7.000 | $7.000 | $5.300 |
| Total Debt ($M) | $4,100 | $4,100 | $4,100 | $4,100 | $4,100 |
| Input | Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Risk-Free Rate (Rf) | 4.25% | 10-yr US Treasury yield |
| Beta (β) | 1.230 | Market beta (Finnhub) |
| Equity Risk Premium (ERP) | 5.5% | Damodaran US ERP |
| Cost of Equity (Ke) | 11.00% | Ke = Rf + β × ERP |
| Pre-Tax Cost of Debt | 5.50% | Interest exp / gross debt |
| After-Tax Cost of Debt (Kd) | 4.35% | × (1 − 21%) |
| Weight Equity (We) | 47.0% | Mkt cap $0.0B |
| Weight Debt (Wd) | 53.0% | Gross debt $0.0B |
| WACC | 8.00% | DCF discount rate |
| Scenario | Stage 1 (Yrs 1–5) | Stage 2 (Yrs 6–10) | Terminal g | WACC | Intrinsic Value | vs Price |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 🔴 Bear | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.0% | 10.00% | $7 | ▼87.1% |
| 📊 Base | 3.0% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 8.00% | $23 | ▼59.3% |
| 🚀 Bull | 8.0% | 5.0% | 3.0% | 7.00% | $64 | ▲12.7% |
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.70B | $0.64B | $0.64B |
| Year 2 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.70B | $0.58B | $1.21B |
| Year 3 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.70B | $0.53B | $1.74B |
| Year 4 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.70B | $0.48B | $2.22B |
| Year 5 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.70B | $0.43B | $2.65B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $0.70B | $0.40B | $3.05B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $0.70B | $0.36B | $3.41B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $0.70B | $0.33B | $3.73B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $0.70B | $0.30B | $4.03B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $0.70B | $0.27B | $4.30B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$8.9B | PV(TV)=$3.4B (44% of EV) | EV=$7.7B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $7.7B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $7 |
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.86B | $0.80B | $0.80B |
| Year 2 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.90B | $0.77B | $1.57B |
| Year 3 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.94B | $0.75B | $2.31B |
| Year 4 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.98B | $0.72B | $3.03B |
| Year 5 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.02B | $0.69B | $3.73B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $1.05B | $0.66B | $4.39B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $1.07B | $0.63B | $5.01B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $1.10B | $0.59B | $5.61B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $1.13B | $0.56B | $6.17B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $1.15B | $0.53B | $6.70B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$21.5B | PV(TV)=$10.0B (60% of EV) | EV=$16.7B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $16.7B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $23 |
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.10B | $1.03B | $1.03B |
| Year 2 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.25B | $1.09B | $2.12B |
| Year 3 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.40B | $1.14B | $3.26B |
| Year 4 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.55B | $1.18B | $4.45B |
| Year 5 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.70B | $1.21B | $5.66B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $1.78B | $1.19B | $6.85B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $1.87B | $1.17B | $8.01B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $1.97B | $1.15B | $9.16B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $2.07B | $1.12B | $10.28B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $2.17B | $1.10B | $11.39B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$55.9B | PV(TV)=$28.4B (71% of EV) | EV=$39.8B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $39.8B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $64 |
| WACC \ gT | 1.5% | 2.0% | 2.5% | 3.0% | 3.5% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6.0% | $30 | $33 | $37 | $42 | $50 |
| 6.5% | $26 | $28 | $31 | $35 | $40 |
| 7.0% | $23 | $25 | $27 | $30 | $34 |
| 7.5% | $21 | $22 | $24 | $26 | $29 |
| 8.0% | $18 | $20 | $21 | $23 | $25 |
| 8.5% | $17 | $18 | $19 | $20 | $22 |
| 9.0% | $15 | $16 | $17 | $18 | $19 |
| 9.5% | $14 | $14 | $15 | $16 | $17 |
| 10.0% | $12 | $13 | $14 | $14 | $15 |
Green = >10% above current price. Red = >10% below. Gold = within ±10%.
Log-linear trend fitted to full price history. ±1.5σ bands. Green shaded zone = bottom 25% of historical range — historically attractive entry.
| Company | Ticker | P/E | EV/EBITDA | P/FCF | Div Yield | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Electrolux | ELUXY | NA | 6.1x | 8.4x | 4.2% | European appliances; restructuring |
| Arcelik | ARCLK | NA | 5.8x | 7.2x | 3.8% | Turkey-based; emerging mkt play |
| LG Electronics | LGLG | NA | 5.2x | 6.8x | 1.5% | Korean peer; not publicly traded |
| WHR — Own | WHR | 9.3x | 4.9x | 5.2x | 9.3% | Cheapest in group; dividend cut risk |
| Year | Low / Actual | Avg | High | # Analysts | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | $8.72 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2023 | $-5.87 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2024 | $-5.87 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2025 | $5.66 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2026 | $5.02 | $6.11 | $7.46 | 11 | Estimate |
| 2027 | $5.87 | $7.17 | $9.24 | 11 | Estimate |
| Year | Low / Actual | Avg | High | # Analysts | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | $19.5B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2023 | $19.5B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2024 | $16.6B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2025 | $15.5B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2026 | $14.9B | $15.5B | $16.4B | 11 | Estimate |
| 2027 | $15.3B | $16.1B | $17.1B | 11 | Estimate |
| Analyst | Firm | Rating | PT | Upside |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Michael Rehaut | JP Morgan | Hold | $76 | +33.7% |
| W. Andrew Carter | Stifel | Hold | $69 | +21.4% |
| W. Andrew Carter | Stifel | Hold | $68 | +19.7% |
| W. Andrew Carter | Stifel | Hold | $68 | +19.7% |
| Michael Rehaut | JP Morgan | Hold | $59 | +3.8% |
- Deep value — but deeply uncertain: WHR at $56.83 trades at 9.3x forward P/E and 4.9x EV/EBITDA vs a peer average of 12-14x. If WHR can sustain $6 EPS (analyst consensus FY2026), the stock is cheap. But the 3-year earnings history is catastrophic (FY2023-2024 losses), and the recovery rests on housing demand that hasn't materialized.
- Housing recovery is the key catalyst — but timing is unknown: WHR's revenue tracks new housing starts and existing home sales. Both remain depressed vs 20-year averages. If housing recovers (mortgage rates decline, supply normalizes), WHR's volumes and pricing both improve simultaneously — a powerful operating leverage play.
- Cost restructuring is real but near its limit: WHR's ~$500M cost savings program has restored profitability without revenue growth. At some point, further cuts impair the brand and product quality. The next earnings beat requires volume recovery, not more cost cuts.
- Dividend is the income story — but it's fragile: WHR cut the dividend from $7.00 to $5.30 in FY2025 — a 24% cut. At $5.30/share and $56.83 price, yield is 9.3%. The cut signals management acknowledged the structural revenue decline was not temporary. Can the dividend hold at $5.30? Depends on FCF stability.
- Analyst PT spread ($51-$145) is a red flag: With 7 Hold ratings and a $94 range between low and high targets, the sell-side has no conviction. The $145 PT (155% upside) implies a full housing recovery and margin expansion — possible but not near-term certain.
Compensation: Equity-based compensation present
Our Board is composed of 14 directors, including an independent Presiding Director and one employee director who is our Chairman and CEO, Marc Bitzer. Our Board includes leaders with expertise in areas critical to our busin
Whirlpool Corporation Leadership BOARD OF DIRECTORS Our Board of 13 directors from multiple industries, 12 of whom are independent, bring skills and experiences that align with Whirlpool Corporation’s strategic priorities. Each of the Board
Marc Robert Bitzer is Chairman/President/CEO at Whirlpool Corp. See Marc Robert Bitzer's compensation, career history, education, & memberships.
Our capital allocation priorities demonstrate our strong commitment to strengthen our balance sheet; expect approximately $700 million of debt pay down in 2025 ... Whirlpool Corporation (NYSE: WHR) is a leading home applian
The company is also optimizing its capital structure by reducing its stake in Whirlpool of India to 20% by mid-2025. This initiative is projected to generate between $550-$600 million in proceeds, which will be allocated to
- good pay
- recommend
CEO approval · Business Outlook · Pros · Work Culture is really good · Cons · There are no cons as such · Show more · Helpful · Share · 5.0 · Sep 29, 2025 · Anonymous employee · Current employee · Recommend · CEO approval ·
Nov 28, 2025 · Senior analyst · Current employee, more than 10 years · Benton Harbor, MI · Recommend · CEO approval · Business outlook · Pros · everyday people are good to work with · Cons · Corporate Culture, dog eat dog, pigeon holed, not
There are tons of people who only ... down. The Culture takes next prize. Whirlpool unfairly approves certain individuals for fully remote roles, while requiring others to come into the office "to collaborate and for the cultur
| Tier | Price | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 — Starter | ≤$21 | Begin position |
| Tier 2 — Add | ≤$15 | Add on weakness |
| Tier 3 — Full | ≤$7 | Full allocation |
| Sell Alert | ≥$58 | Above fair value — consider trimming |
Initiate at HOLD. WHR is a value trap for now. The housing recovery thesis is intellectually sound — but the timing is unknowable. The stock is cheap on every metric (9x P/E, 4.9x EV/EBITDA, 9.3% dividend yield) but cheap can get cheaper when revenue is declining and the dividend is at risk. Wait for confirmed housing recovery signals before building a position. If already held, the 9.3% dividend yield provides income while waiting.
Base target: $82 (analyst consensus; 13x P/E on FY2027 EPS $7.17 = $93 — discount for execution risk gives $80-82).
Avoid above $90. WHR at 14x+ forward P/E prices in the housing recovery with no margin of safety for further delays.
| Assumption | Rationale / Notes |
|---|---|
| FCF Base | FY2025 FCF $813M — minimal vs $4B+ historical peak. Model uses $813M as conservative base. FCF margin 5.2% vs 10%+ in healthy housing cycles. |
| WACC | Beta 1.23 (elevated — cyclical consumer durable). Ke = 4.25% + 1.23×5.5% = 11.0%. Kd (after-tax) = 5.5%×(1-21%) = 4.35%. We=47% (MktCap $3.6B), Wd=53% (high leverage for this sector). WACC = 8.0%. |
| Sanity Check | Base IV ~$86 vs analyst PT $82.00 — within ±20% band (+4.9%). Good calibration. |
| Key Risk | WHR is deeply cyclical and housing-sensitive. Revenue has declined 29% from peak ($21.9B in 2021 to $15.5B in 2025). The DCF terminal value is highly sensitive to gT and WACC assumptions. Bear IV $47 vs Base IV $86 — wide range reflects genuine uncertainty. |