WU
WU
The Western Union Company is a global money transfer and payment services company, operating in 200+ countries and territories. WU's core business is consumer-to-consumer (C2C) money transfers — primarily migrant workers sending wages home. The industry is under severe structural pressure from digital disruption: mobile wallets (M-Pesa, Venmo, Zelle, Wise), crypto transfers, and fintech competitors have eroded WU's market share in every corridor. WU is attempting a multi-year transformation: expanding into business payments (W2G), digital-first transfers (WU.com, mobile app), and bill payment (newmoney). The core C2C business generates substantial FCF (~$500M/yr) which funds a generous dividend — but that FCF is declining.
| Business Segment | Revenue | % of Total | YoY Growth | Margin | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| C2C — Consumer-to-Consumer | $2,700M | 67% | -5.0% | — | Legacy wire; 200+ countries; migrant worker corridors |
| C2B — Consumer-to-Business | $600M | 15% | -2.0% | — | Bill payment, newmoney, WU Pay |
| B2B — Business Solutions | $500M | 12% | +5.0% | — | Cross-border B2B payments for corporates |
| Other / Corp | $250M | 6% | +0.0% | — | GPE, corporate overhead |
| Blended Growth Rate | — | 100% | -3.0% | — | Weighted avg across segments |
Startup
Hyper Growth
Self Funding
Operating Leverage
Capital Return
Decline
Stage 5 — Value / Turnaround: Mature business returning capital via dividends and buybacks. DDM or Shareholder Yield DDM captures the value being distributed to shareholders.
Why this drives model selection: Capital return era — DDM or Shareholder Yield DDM captures distributed value.
| Metric | Value | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| ROIC | 9.5% | 8–12% adequate |
| FCF Margin | 12.4% | ≥10% strong |
| Debt / EBITDA | 2.9x | 2–4x moderate |
| Revenue Trend | Declining 3yr | 3-year directional trend |
| FCF Margin Trend | Stable (±1pp) | Directional margin trajectory |
| Analyst Revisions | Neutral | Last 90 days consensus direction |
| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($M) | $5,071 | $4,357 | $4,210 | $4,210 | $4,051 |
| Rev YoY Growth | — | -14.1% | -3.4% | +0.0% | -3.8% |
| Gross Margin | 42.9% | 42.4% | 40.0% | 37.7% | 37.0% |
| EBITDA ($M) | $1,331 | $1,001 | $905 | $905 | $923 |
| EBITDA Margin | 26.2% | 23.0% | 21.5% | 21.5% | 22.8% |
| Operating Income ($M) | $1,123 | $885 | $726 | $726 | $757 |
| Operating Margin | 22.1% | 20.3% | 17.2% | 17.2% | 18.7% |
| Net Income ($M) | $806 | $269 | $691 | $934 | $500 |
| Net Margin | 15.9% | 6.2% | 16.4% | 22.2% | 12.3% |
| EPS (diluted) | $1.97 | $1.69 | $2.74 | $2.74 | $1.52 |
| Free Cash Flow ($M) | $1,008 | $549 | $369 | $369 | $505 |
| Annual DPS | $0.940 | $0.940 | $0.940 | $0.940 | $0.940 |
| Total Debt ($M) | $3,100 | $3,100 | $3,100 | $3,100 | $3,200 |
| Input | Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Risk-Free Rate (Rf) | 4.25% | 10-yr US Treasury yield |
| Beta (β) | 0.570 | Market beta (Finnhub) |
| Equity Risk Premium (ERP) | 5.5% | Damodaran US ERP |
| Cost of Equity (Ke) | 7.39% | Ke = Rf + β × ERP |
| Pre-Tax Cost of Debt | 5.50% | Interest exp / gross debt |
| After-Tax Cost of Debt (Kd) | 4.35% | × (1 − 21%) |
| Weight Equity (We) | 48.4% | Mkt cap $0.0B |
| Weight Debt (Wd) | 51.6% | Gross debt $0.0B |
| WACC | 8.50% | DCF discount rate |
| Scenario | Stage 1 (Yrs 1–5) | Stage 2 (Yrs 6–10) | Terminal g | WACC | Intrinsic Value | vs Price |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 🔴 Bear | -2.0% | 0.0% | 1.5% | 10.50% | $5 | ▼42.9% |
| 📊 Base | 2.5% | 2.0% | 2.0% | 8.50% | $19 | ▲98.1% |
| 🚀 Bull | 6.0% | 4.0% | 2.5% | 7.50% | $46 | ▲389.6% |
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.44B | $0.40B | $0.40B |
| Year 2 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.44B | $0.36B | $0.76B |
| Year 3 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.44B | $0.33B | $1.08B |
| Year 4 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.44B | $0.30B | $1.38B |
| Year 5 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.44B | $0.27B | $1.65B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $0.44B | $0.24B | $1.89B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $0.44B | $0.22B | $2.11B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $0.44B | $0.20B | $2.31B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $0.44B | $0.18B | $2.48B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $0.44B | $0.16B | $2.65B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$5.0B | PV(TV)=$1.8B (41% of EV) | EV=$4.5B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $4.5B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $5 |
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.53B | $0.49B | $0.49B |
| Year 2 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.56B | $0.48B | $0.96B |
| Year 3 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.59B | $0.46B | $1.43B |
| Year 4 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.61B | $0.44B | $1.87B |
| Year 5 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.63B | $0.42B | $2.29B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $0.64B | $0.39B | $2.68B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $0.66B | $0.37B | $3.05B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $0.67B | $0.35B | $3.40B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $0.68B | $0.33B | $3.72B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $0.70B | $0.31B | $4.03B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$10.9B | PV(TV)=$4.8B (54% of EV) | EV=$8.9B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $8.9B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $19 |
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.68B | $0.63B | $0.63B |
| Year 2 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.75B | $0.65B | $1.28B |
| Year 3 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.82B | $0.66B | $1.94B |
| Year 4 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.89B | $0.67B | $2.61B |
| Year 5 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.96B | $0.67B | $3.28B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $1.00B | $0.65B | $3.92B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $1.04B | $0.63B | $4.55B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $1.08B | $0.61B | $5.16B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $1.12B | $0.59B | $5.74B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $1.17B | $0.57B | $6.31B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$23.9B | PV(TV)=$11.6B (65% of EV) | EV=$17.9B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $17.9B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $46 |
| WACC \ gT | 1.5% | 2.0% | 2.5% | 3.0% | 3.5% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6.5% | $25 | $27 | $30 | $34 | $39 |
| 7.0% | $22 | $24 | $26 | $29 | $32 |
| 7.5% | $19 | $21 | $22 | $25 | $27 |
| 8.0% | $17 | $18 | $20 | $21 | $24 |
| 8.5% | $15 | $16 | $17 | $19 | $20 |
| 9.0% | $14 | $14 | $15 | $17 | $18 |
| 9.5% | $12 | $13 | $14 | $15 | $16 |
| 10.0% | $11 | $12 | $12 | $13 | $14 |
| 10.5% | $10 | $10 | $11 | $12 | $12 |
Green = >10% above current price. Red = >10% below. Gold = within ±10%.
Log-linear trend fitted to full price history. ±1.5σ bands. Green shaded zone = bottom 25% of historical range — historically attractive entry.
| Company | Ticker | P/E | EV/EBITDA | P/FCF | Div Yield | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MoneyGram | MGI | NA | 3.1x | 4.2x | 0.0% | C2C peer; acquired by Alibaba JV |
| Wise | WISE | 74.2x | 38.4x | 58.1x | 0.0% | High-growth fintech; expensive |
| PayPal | PYPL | 16.8x | 12.4x | 14.2x | 0.0% | Digital payments platform |
| WU — Own | WU | 6.0x | 4.3x | 5.2x | 9.3% | Highest yield; secular decline risk |
| Year | Low / Actual | Avg | High | # Analysts | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | $1.69 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2023 | $2.74 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2024 | $1.52 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2025 | $1.52 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2026 | $1.72 | $1.85 | $1.93 | 21 | Estimate |
| 2027 | $1.76 | $1.98 | $2.12 | 21 | Estimate |
| Year | Low / Actual | Avg | High | # Analysts | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | $4.4B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2023 | $4.2B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2024 | $4.2B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2025 | $4.1B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2026 | $3.9B | $4.4B | $4.6B | 21 | Estimate |
| 2027 | $4.0B | $4.6B | $4.8B | 21 | Estimate |
| Analyst | Firm | Rating | PT | Upside |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sanjay Sakhrani | KBW | Hold | $10 | +5.5% |
| James Friedman | Susquehanna | Hold | $10 | +5.5% |
| Ramsey El-Assal | Cantor Fitzgerald | Sell | $9 | -5.1% |
| Timothy Chiodo | UBS | Hold | $9 | -5.1% |
| Bryan Keane | Citigroup | Hold | $9 | -5.1% |
- The 9% dividend is the only game in town — but it's not sustainable forever: WU yields 9.3% ($0.94/share on $9.48 stock). At $500M FCF and $328M shares, FCF/share is $1.54 — the dividend costs $308M. That's 61% payout, manageable. But if FCF falls to $400M, the dividend is at risk. The market is effectively pricing a dividend cut as a near-certainty within 2-3 years.
- Secular decline is real but slowing: C2C volumes have fallen 3-5% annually for 5+ years. At some point the decline rate must stabilize — the remaining users are sticky (elderly, unbanked, underbanked populations that can't use digital alternatives). The floor on C2C is real. If the decline rate moderates to -2-3%, the business stabilizes.
- Transformation is credible but unproven: WU has made real investments in digital (WU.com, mobile app, Wise partnership) and B2B (W2G). Revenue declined only -3.8% in FY2025 vs -3.4% in FY2024 — the rate of decline is not accelerating. If digital can offset C2C decline, FCF could stabilize around $500M.
- Valuation is genuinely cheap: WU at $9.48 trades at 6.0x P/E and 4.3x EV/EBITDA. At FCF yield of 16% ($1.54 FCF/share / $9.48), the stock is pricing in a business in terminal decline. If WU stabilizes even at $500M FCF, the stock is worth $10-12 (5-6x FCF with 9% dividend).
- Buyback program adds small but consistent value: WU has been buying back ~$100-200M/yr in stock. At current prices, that's 2-5% annual reduction in share count — meaningful compounding if FCF stabilizes.
Compensation: Equity-based compensation present
After more than 25 years of business and leadership experience, Devin joined Western Union as its CEO in late 2021. Previously, he was Senior Group President, Global Business Solutions at Fiserv, Inc.
After more than 25 years of business and leadership experience, Devin joined Western Union as its CEO in late 2021. Previously, he was Senior Group President, Global Business Solutions at Fiserv, Inc.
Western Union's CEO is Devin McGranahan, appointed in Dec 2021, has a tenure of 4.33 years. total yearly compensation is $10.70M, comprised of 9.3% salary and 90.7% bonuses, including company stock and options. directl
Adjusted constant currency revenue growth metrics for 2023 exclude contributions from Business Solutions. Adjusted operating profit metrics for 2023 exclude contributions from Business Solutions and acquisition and divestit
Information on stock, financials, earnings, subsidiaries, investors, and executives for Western Union. Use the PitchBook Platform to explore the full profile.
- recommend
- layoffs
Oct 22, 2025 · Anonymous employee · Current employee · Recommend · CEO approval · Business Outlook · Pros · Huge growth opportunities, higher salaries than other tech companies in the area, collaborative, fun-focused office culture<
Aug 27, 2025 · Senior auditor · Current employee, more than 1 year · Recommend · CEO approval · Business outlook · Pros · - Western Union is a recognizable name that may carry weight on a résumé - Subsidized lunch is nice a good office loca
Jul 13, 2025 · Senior security analyst · Current employee, more than 3 years · Pune · Recommend · CEO approval · Business Outlook · Pros · Learn more and work with great mind of the industry. Cons · Under the pressure of layoffs · Show more
| Tier | Price | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 — Starter | ≤$17 | Begin position |
| Tier 2 — Add | ≤$12 | Add on weakness |
| Tier 3 — Full | ≤$5 | Full allocation |
| Sell Alert | ≥$39 | Above fair value — consider trimming |
Initiate at ACCUMULATE (high-yield income play). WU is not a growth story and never will be again. But the 9.3% dividend yield is real — covered by FCF at $500M base, with a credible path to stabilization. For Najee's income portfolio, WU at $9.48 is a high-yield position with downside protection: if the business stabilizes at current FCF, the stock is worth $10-12. If it continues declining, a dividend cut could bring the stock to $6-7 — but the dividend income received while holding provides a significant return buffer.
Base target: $9.50 (essentially flat; 6x P/E on FY2027 EPS $1.98 = $11.88 — discounted for continued decline gives $9.50).
Avoid above $11. Above $11, WU yields less than 8.5% and the dividend sustainability argument weakens. Exit or trim on rallies.
| Assumption | Rationale / Notes |
|---|---|
| FCF Base | FY2025 FCF $505M. FCF fluctuates significantly due to working capital timing and one-time charges. Normalized FCF ~$500M is the right base. |
| WACC | Beta 0.57 (low — WU is a stable cash flow business despite decline). Ke = 4.25% + 0.57×5.5% = 7.39%. Kd (after-tax) = 5.5%×(1-21%) = 4.35%. We=48%, Wd=52%. WACC = 8.5%. |
| Sanity Check | Base IV ~$9.40 vs analyst PT $9.00 — within ±20% band (-4.3%). Good calibration. |
| Key Risk | Secular decline in C2C volumes is the existential risk. WU is not a buy-and-holdforever story. Monitor dividend sustainability and digital transformation progress quarterly. |